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Our Economy of Mothers and Others: Women
and Economics Revisited
Joan Williams*

I. INTRODUCTION
A property lawyer coined the term "feminization of poverty" in the late
1970s to highlight the prevalence of women among the poor.' The
feminization of poverty is an important topic in an age when the disparity in
incomes is growing in the United States, and welfare is being "reformed"-that is, from the view of many recipients, abolished as an entitlement.2 This
take on the feminization of poverty, while important, is limited in a country
with a current poverty rate of 11.8%. 3 This article will argue that we need to
fold the traditional debate on the proportion of women among the poor into a
more sweeping analysis of the relationship between women and economics.
In doing this, we should follow the lead of the growing international
awareness, which focuses more broadly on women's relationship to
economic security. 4 Statistics show that women are the poorest of the

* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law, Director, Program on
Gender, Work & Family. This paper was written for The Journalof Gender, Race & Justice's fifth
annual symposium, The Feminization of Poverty (Oct. 23, 2000). Many thanks to Professor Sherry
Colb for helpful comments and a close reading, and to the other members of the Symposium, the
Rutgers Faculty Speaker Series, the California Western School of Law, and the American
University, Washington College of Law Faculty Speaker Series, where this article was presented in
draft form. Particular thanks to my colleague Professor Walter Effross for suggesting I use the
phrase "mothers and others" as the title of this article.
1. Diana Pearce, The Feminization of Poverty: Women, Work and Welfare, 11 URB. & SOC.
CHANGE REv. 28 (Winter/Spring 1978).
2. See, e.g., Child Support and Welfare Costs: Interview with Mary Jo Bane, Former
Assistant Secretaryfor Children andFamilies, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 4
GEO. PUB. POL'Y REv. 9, 12 (1998); Vada Waters Lindsey, The Burden ofBeing Poor: Increased
Tax Liability? The Taxation of Self-Help Programs, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 225 (Winter 1999);
Cynthia Negrey et al., Job Training Under Welfare Reform: Opportunitiesfor and Obstacles to
Economic Self-Sufficiency Among Low Income Women, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 347
(Summer 2000); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Roadfrom Welfare to Work: Informal Transportation
and the Urban Poor,38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173 (Winter 2001).
3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY RATE LOWEST IN 20 YEARS, HOUSEHOLD INCOME AT
RECORD HIGH, CENSUS BUREAU REPORTS (Sept. 26, 2000), at http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/2000/eb00-158.html.
4. See, e.g., The United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, at
http://www.undp.org/fwcw/csw.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2002); see also The United Nations
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world's poor. Women are not only fifty-ninepercent of those in poverty and
seventy percent of those in extreme poverty, but they also "earn less than a
tenth of the world's income and own less than one percent of the world's
6
property."
If our goal is an analysis of women's economic welfare, what better7
place to start than with Charlotte Perkins Gilman's Women andEconomics?
This classic treatment, published in 1898, established the framework we still
use today. Gilman's central focus is on women's dependence:
[W]omen, as a class, neither produce nor distribute wealth...
women, as individuals, labor mainly as house servants, are not paid
as such, and would not be satisfied.., if they were so paid...
wives are not business partners or co-producers of wealth with
their husbands, unless they actually practice the same
profession ... they are not salaried as mothers, and that it would be
unspeakably degrading if they were, what remains to those who
deny that women are supported by men?8
And, tartly, "the 9female of the genus homo is supported by the male." He is
her food supply.
Gilman has no doubt that women are supported by men. This support is
both an affront to their dignity ("the pitiful dependence of the human
female" 10) and corrosive of their character ("the sluggish and greedy
disposition bred of long ages of dependence"ll). Her solution is to
restructure the tasks performed by wives along the industrial model. For
instance, houses without kitchens will mean that professional chefs will cook
the meals. Even childcare will be professionalized under this model. 12 The
Division for the Advancement of Women, at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/ (last visited Jan.
25, 2002).
5. See Jane Lee Saber, Women and the InternationalMonetary Fund, 5 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 335, 337 (Spring 1999) (stating that among the 1.2 billion people living in extreme poverty
within undeveloped countries, 59% are female); UNIFEM, STRENGTHENING WOMEN'S ECONOMIC
CAPACITY, at http://www.unifem.undp.org/economic.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2001) (stating women
represent 70% of the 1.3 billion people that live in absolute poverty and when nearly 900 million
women have less than $1 a day, the association between gender inequality and poverty remains a
harrowing reality).
6. See Gillian Moon, Trade and Women
in Developing Countries, at
http://www.caa.org.au/horizons/hl3/trade.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2000) (citing Erika Gottfried,
Note, Mercosur: A Tool to Further Women's Rights in the Member Nations, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
923, 925, 953 (1998)).
7.

CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, WOMEN AND ECONOMICS (Dover Publ'ns, Inc. 1998)

(1898).

8.

Id. at9.

9.

Id. at 18.

10.

Id. at 19.

11.

Id. at 76.

12.

Id. at 104-10.
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Gilman tradition, echoed virtually unchanged some sixty years later by Betty
Friedan in The Feminine Mystique, dominates popular imagery of American
feminism to this day. 13 Feminism today is still associated with an insistence
on employment for women with day care centers as the solution for the
conflict between work and family demands.
I have argued that the Gilman model 14 is flawed because it accepts too
readily three basic elements of the housewife/breadwinner system historians
call domesticity. First, it accepts the current construction of paid labor,
which reflects the ideal of a worker who starts to work in early adulthood
and works for forty years straight, taking no time off for child-bearing or
child-rearing. 15 Second, it accepts the dichotomy between home and work,
and the notion that household work is not "work.", 16 Reva Siegel
documented that before the nineteenth century, society openly
acknowledged the economic value of women's household labor. 17 However,
the advent of domesticity's new sex/gender arrangements erased the
economic value of household work. 18 Consequently, today there is an
attitude among homemakers that they "don't work." 19 Finally, the Gilman
reproductive work is a private
model embraces the privatized theory that
20
responsibility and not a public necessity.
We need to change each element of domesticity in order to create a new
model for the analysis of women and economics. I will begin with a broad
overview of the elements for this new model. Then I will describe each
element in greater detail. Finally, I will propose an analytic framework that

13.

BETTYFRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963).

14.

I call the Gilman model "the full-commodification" model. See JOAN WILLIAMS,

UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000)

[hereinafter UNBENDING GENDER].
15.

Id. at2.

16.

Id. at 31-33 (citing historians Nancy Cott and Jeanne Boydston).

17. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Women's Rights Claims Concerning
Wive's Household Labor, 1850-1880, at 103 YALE L.L 1073, 1092 (1994) ("In the nineteenth
century, wives' economic contribution to the household was no longer as 'visible' as it had been in
more subsistence-oriented agrarian economies of the colonial and Revolutionary eras.").

18.

id. at 1093.

19. See id.at 1092-93 ("As it became more common for men to exchange their labor for
money-wages, production for use came to be identified as a distinctly female activity, associated
with the social, but not economic, maintenance of family life. Census measures of the economy that
appeared in the aftermath of the Civil War characterized such labor as 'unproductive,' and,
consistent with this gendered valuation of family labor, excluded women engaged in incomeproducing work in the household from the count of those 'gainfully employed.' In so doing, they
gave official expression to what were already deeply entrenched assumptions of popular discourse,
which denied that wives' work was work.").
20. For brilliant and forceful contestations of this premise, see Martha Fineman, Cracking
the FoundationalMyths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 13 (2000); see also NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART 14 (2001) (discussing
women's reproductive rights).
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changes gender arrangements in both market work and family work.
II.

THE BASIC SKETCH

Discussions of women and poverty tend to focus on "welfare," the
social safety net designed for the impoverished. Yet, the social safety net
affects only women's relationship to a small fraction of our economy.
Welfare programs constitute a tiny fraction, three to four percent,2 1 of the
federal budget; much more important are "entitlement" programs such as
social security, unemployment insurance, our elaborate system of tax and
22
other social expenditures.
If the goal is to analyze women's relationship to the public distribution
of wealth, it makes no sense to focus our attention only on a small fraction
of government budgets. We need to bring the analysis of other government
programs (now considered topics of interest only to specialists) into the
mainstream of gender research. Thus far, the only government program
other than welfare that has received extensive gender analysis is tax. Critical
tax theory can provide many of the tools we need for analysis of the public
sector. 23 This is an important step, but we need to go further. To gain a
balanced picture of women's relationship to economic security, we need to
examine women's relationship to private as well as public wealth.
To the extent that we discuss women's relationship to the private
economy, the tendency is to focus on women's workforce participation. Yet
this approach itself is gendered. The economic security of most men depends
on their employment status, but the economic security of many women does
not. American women still do eighty percent of the childcare, 24 and this

21. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE 2000 GREEN BOOK, at http://aspe.gov/2000gb/appeni.txt (last visited
Apr. 2, 2001).
22. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Devicefor Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970) (introducing the
policy of tax incentives).
23. See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1574 (1996) ("Tax
scholars have previously noted that the current tax structure, in effect, encourages women to perform
more housework than if the economic gains of all labor were taxed; however, they have failed to
acknowledge that exempting household labor from the tax base also denies women important social
welfare benefits directly tied to taxation."); Nancy E. Shurtz, Critical Tax Theory: Still Not Taken
Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1837, 1887 (1998) ("The chief contribution this new scholarship can
make is to shift the terms of taxation discourse to bring a broader array of concerns to the policy
table in the hope that taxation may be employed as a more powerful and flexible tool in the effort to
elevate social welfare through a higher commitment to social justice.").
24.

JOHN P. ROBINSON & GEOFFREY GODBEY, TIME FOR LIFE: THE SURPRISING WAYS

AMERICANS USE THEIR TIME 104 (1997); see also SHARON HAYS, THE CULTURAL
CONTRADICTIONS OF MOTHERHOOD 100 (1996) (stating that in married couples, mothers contribute
seventy-four percent of the total hours spent in direct childcare). I do not have data for single
mothers, but one assumes they do more.
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family work often affects their participation in paid work.25 For this reason,
in order to analyze women's relationship to private wealth, we need to
consider not only their paid but also their family work. In the United States
this boils down to a discussion of divorce law, but the real issue is one of
who owns what within the family.
To summarize, we need to widen our analysis of women and economic
security to include the social safety net and the disproportionate percentage
of women among the poor. We also need to consider how other government
wealth-distribution programs, from social "entitlements" to the tax system,
systematically favor men over women. Finally, we need to analyze women's
relationship to private as well as public wealth through a consideration both
of women's relationship to paid work, and their entitlements based on family
relationships.
A. Access to Economic Security through Market Work
Today two statistics frame the way we look at women and paid work.
The first is women's workforce participation, a demographic measure that
documents the demise of the breadwinner/housewife model as women
entered the workforce.2 6 The second is the wage gap, which measures the
gap between the wages of men who work full-time against the wages of
women who work full-time. 2 7 Both statistics reflect the Gilmore model; they
are designed to measure the extent to which women are in the labor force
working shoulder to shoulder with men, as ideal workers who become
employed in early adulthood, and remained employed, full-time and fullforce, for forty years straight.
While the work patterns and wages of women without children are
looking increasingly like those of ideal-worker men, the same is not true of
mothers. If we look at mothers during the key years of career advancement,
aged twenty-five to forty-four, two out of three do not perform as ideal
workers even in the minimal sense of working forty hours per week all year.
What is more dramatic is that ninety-two percent work less than fifty hours
per week. 2 8 In an age where virtually all good jobs require full-time work,
and many of the best jobs require overtime, mothers are cut out of the labor

25. See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 14, at 2 (stating that although family work affects
the welfare participation of many mothers, it is also true that many mothers in the workforce perform
as ideal workers much the same as non-mothers).
26.

BARBARA tR BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 5 (1986).

27. UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 14, at 66-86; see also THE NATIONAL COMMITrEE ON
PAY EQUITY, LITTLE PROGRESS INCLOSING WAGE GAP IN 2000 (noting that women make seventythree percent of men's earnings), at http://www.feminist.com/fairpay/f wagegap.htm (last visited
Jan. 22, 2002).
28.

Thanks to Suzanne Bianchi and Liana Sayer for calculating these figures from the

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS & BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MARCH 1999 CURRENT POPULATION

SURVEY, at http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/cpsmain.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2002).
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pool for many desirable jobs, blue- as well as white-collar.
B. Economy of Mothers in Comparisonto Others
Women without children earn ninety percent of the wages of men, but
mothers earn only sixty percent of the wages of fathers. 2 9 The "family gap"
30
between the wages of mothers and other adults increased during the 1980s
and may still be rising among the least privileged women. 3 1 If we look not at
women's workforce participation but at whether they perform as ideal
workers along with men, what emerges is a picture of the fragile hold
women have on market work in a society where 32
nearly ninety percent of
women become mothers during their working lives.
In short, a focus on wage gap and workforce participation figures tends
to exaggerate the extent to which women have reached economic equality.
After all, two-thirds of working women work less than forty hours per
week. 33 Therefore, the wage gap statistic comparing women who work fulltime with men who work full-time grossly overestimates the extent of
women's equality. Workforce participation statistics are equally misleading:
consider the woman lawyer who dropped out of her legal career and ran a
part-time quilt business from her home. 34 Though she was "in the
workforce," she remained firmly marginalized and economically vulnerable.
We need new
economic measures that document our economy of mothers
35
and others.
At a deeper level, we need to reassess Gilman's assumption that the key
to economic equality is for women to perform as ideal workers along with
men while childcare is delegated to professional childcare workers. As a
model for economic e uality this has proved to be morally troubling and of
limited effectiveness. Particularly in an age of high overtime, we need to
29.

Id.

30. Jane Waldfogel, Understandingthe "Family Gap" in Pay for Women with Children, 12
J. ECON. PERSP. 137, 143 (Winter 1998).
31. Jane Waldfogel & Susan E. Mayer, GenderDifferences in the Low- Wage Labor Market,
in FINDING JOBS: WORK & WELFARE REFORM 214-15 (David E. Card & Rebecca M. Blank eds.,
2000).
32. UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 14, at 2 (quoting Jane Waldfogel, The Effect of
Children on Women's Wages, 92 AM. SOC. REV. 209,209 (1997)).
33.

See id. (citing the computations of Professor Manuelita Ureta).

34.

Id at 1.

35. In the Ideal Worker Project, funded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, I will be working
with demographer Suzanne Bianchi to generate a new data series designed to document mothers'
marginalization.
36. The model is morally troubling, in a society without the political will to provide publicly
subsidized childcare, because it consigns many children to market childcare of questionable quality.
NATIONAL INST. OF CHILD HEALTH & HUMAN DEV., THE NICHD STUDY OF EARLY CHILDCARE

(1998). Rather, the current system solves privileged women's gender troubles by taking advantage of

HeinOnline -- 5 J. Gender Race & Just. 416 2001-2002

Our Economy of Mothers and Others

go back and rethink how we define the "committed" or "responsible"
worker.
The problem with pinning our hopes for women's equality on a strategy
of having women perform as ideal workers, as June Carbone said long ago,
is that "it leaves out the small matter of who will take care of the
children." 37 The real issue is that our ideals at work do not fit with our ideals
for family life. In a society with the longest hours of overtime in the
industrialized world, longer even than Japan's, the ideal-worker norm
clashes with our sense of what we owe to children. Fathers who work fulltime work an average of forty-eight hours per week.3 8 This increases when
combined with their average commutes, 39 meaning that they may well be
gone from home ten or more hours each weekday. Who among us thinks the
ideal way to raise children is for both parents to be gone from nine a.m. to
seven, eight or nine p.m.?
We are caught in the clash of two social ideals: the ideal-worker norm
on the job, and the norm of parental care at home. This clash combines with
gender performance norms that engenders in most women the desire to be a
"real mother" (complete with milk, cookies, and carpool),40 and into most
men the desire to be a "real man" (which includes performing as an ideal
worker to the extent his race, class, and personality allow him to do so). The
end result is that gender has proved unbending. The economy of mothers and
others will not change until we redefine the ideal worker and restructure
market work, and thereby, redefine our work ideals so that they are more in
sync with
our traditions of nurturance. The key here is family responsive
41
policies.
C. Access to Economic Security through Family Work
One out of four mothers is still a housewife during the key years of
career advancement. 42 Economic security for many women clearly does not
depend on paid work but on entitlements gained within the family.
Moreover, homemakers are not the only ones whose economic security
depends on entitlements gained through family life. Women who work parttheir privileged position in class and racial hierarchies. See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 14, at
145-76.
37.

June Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Community, 31

Hous. L. REV.359 (Summer 1994).
38. JAMES A. LEVINE & TODD L. P1TrINSKY, WORKING FATHERS: NEW STRATEGIES FOR
BALANCING WORK AND FAMILY 25 (1997).

39.

Id.

40. See generally HAYS, supra note 24; Naomi R. Cahn, GenderedIdentities: Women and
Household Work, 44 VILL. L. REV. 525 (1999).
41.

See discussion infra Part IV.

42.

UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 14, at 2.
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time can expect to make a fraction of what their husbands or ex-husbands
make, given the depressed wages of part-time workers. 43 Even women who
work full-time often have wages that are comparatively low.44 The end
result is that, in the average American family, the father still earns nearly
seventy percent of the family income. 45 Thus, economic security depends on
entitlements gained within the family relationships not only for homemakers
but also for many women who work part-time or even full-time outside the
home.
The only existing conversation for discussing this topic is the "new
theory of alimony" debate in family law; 46 however, the issues at stake here
require more than a narrow focus on alimony, which has traditionally been
based on need rather than on ownership 47 and has never been awarded to
more than a small fraction of women (currently around eight percent).4 8
Instead, we need a more sweeping consideration of who owns what within
the family.
To undertake this analysis, we need to examine domesticity's definition
of paid work as "real work," while defining equally important care work as
"not working." I like to quote one mother:
I get so sick of people asking me, "Do you work?" Of course I
work! I've got five children under ten! I work twenty-four hours a
day! But of course they mean, "Do you work for pay, outside your
home?" Sometimes I hear myself
say, "No, I don't work," and I
49
lie!"
complete
a
"that's
think,
It is a complete lie and one with important social implications. A key tenet
of domesticity is that wives are "supported" by men who "work." In fact, the
only reason a father can perform as an ideal worker is that he typically is
supported by a flow of childcare and other family work from his partner
(whether they are currently married, or ever have been). Once we notice the

43.

Id. at 72.

44. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT
POPULATION
SURVEY
(Oct.
20,
2000),
available
at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/wkyeng.t02.html (noting that the median weekly earnings for fulltime wage and salaried women age twenty-five and over in the third quarter of 2000 was $519,
compared to S700 for men).
Thanks to Steve Hipple for calculating these figures from the CURRENT POPULATION
OF LABOR STATISTICS & BUREAU OF THE CENSUS (Mar. 1999),
http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/cpsmain.htm.
45.

SURVEY,

BUREAU

46. For a comprehensive listing of the contributions to this debate, see Joan Williams,
Symposium On Divorce and Feminist Legal Themy: Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of
Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2228 n.2 (1994).
47. See generally LESLIE HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 370-401 (1996) (providing an
overview of spousal support after divorce with excerpts from case law and secondary authorities).
48.

See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 14, at 122.

49.

Id. at 33.
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father's dependence on that flow of family work, we can see that the chief
family asset in most households, the ideal-worker wage, reflects not only the
father's paid work but also the mother's family work.
Note how this analysis flips the traditional understanding of who is
dependent upon whom;5 1 the common understanding, accepted by Gilman,
is that women depend on men. 52 In order to change domesticity's erasure of
household work, we need to place front and center the idea that family work
53
is work, not leisure, and that it is an integral part of the overall economy.
One would think that an asset reflecting the work of two family
members would be jointly owned. But that's not what happens today. In
divorce courts, in the economy of gratitude in intact marriages, 54 and in
many government benefits programs, 55 56
the husband typically is treated as
the sole owner of the ideal-worker wage.
There is a little bit of wealth redistribution throughout family law but
not much;57 alimony is rare, temporary, and generally low because most
families have so little savings; no property distribution rule has much
effect.58 Two prominent economists estimate that fathers as a group pay
only six percent of their income in child support, although some fathers pay
a lot more.59 In this context, it should not be surprising that nearly forty
percent of divorced mothers end up living in poverty.60 When we take a step
back from this analysis, we can see that what we have, and what we are
exporting through globalization, is a system in which men specialize in paid
work, work linked with ownership, while women specialize in family work,
leisure linked with economic vulnerability.
The logic is clear. When you define the ideal worker as someone
without responsibility for children, you set up a childcare system that pushes
50. The implication here is that a homemaker married to a rich man will receive more than
one married to a poor one. Changing our notion of who owns what within the family, unfortunately,
cannot address the unconscionably wide disparities of income in the United States.
51.

CompareFineman,supranote 20 (defining caretakers as subsidizing the state).

52. GILMAN, supra note 7, at 5 (describing the common belief that although men make and
distribute wealth, women earn their share as wives).
53.

See generally JEANNE BoYDSTON, HoME AND WORK (1990).

54. See ARLiE HOCHCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFr 110-27 (1989) (discussing the "economy of
gratitude").
55.

UNBENDING GENDER,supranote 14, at 131.

56.

Id. at 115.

57.

Id. at 121-22.

58.

Id.

59. E-mail from Sara McClanahan, Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs, Princeton
University, and Irv Garfinkel, Professor of Contemporary Urban Problems, Columbia University, to
Joan Williams, Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law (Jan. 11, 2000)
(on file with author).
60.

DEMIKuRTz, FOR RICHERFORPOORER3 (1995).
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the primary caregivers to the margins of economic life. In a few European
countries the government steps in to redistribute wealth to women and
children. 6 1 However, the absence of such a system in most other regions
leads to predictably high levels of child and maternal poverty. In the United
62
States, eighty percent of those living in poverty are women and children.
Few governments in developed countries have the political desire to save
women and children from the gendered logic of the private economy; some
European countries have outstanding supports for caregivers, 63 but many
other developed countries, notably the United States, do not.64 Even fewer
developing countries have the resources to do so. Unless we want to export
our economy of mothers and others through globalization, we need to
redefine the relationship of women to private wealth, not only in the United
States, but worldwide.
III. ACCESS TO

ECONOMIC SECURITY THROUGHT THE GOVERNMENT

Completing our analysis of women and economic security requires an
analysis of women's relationship not only to private wealth, but also to
government wealth. Scholars of the social safety net have led the way in
65
delineating how government wealth distribution programs affect women.
The next step is to move from an analysis of women to an analysis of
gender. When the series of programs commonly known as "welfare" is seen
through the lens of domesticity, what emerges is a particularly pernicious
example of how women's family work is erased and treated as leisure. Thus,
the impoverished mother who takes three buses
at midnight to get her
66
asthmatic child to the hospital is defined as lazy.
A. The Linked Fate of Women and Children
An analysis that starts with domesticity also highlights the way our
economic system links the fate of women and children. A system that
provides for the care of children by economically marginalizing their
caregivers is one that systematically impoverishes children as well as
women. This is in sharp contrast to the view that women's equality will hurt

61. Joan Williams, Afterword: Exploring the Economic Meanings of Gender, 49 AM. U. L.
REv. 989 (2000).
62.

UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 14, at 115.

63.

See ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD 239-49, 264 (2001) (finding that

Sweden and France have extensive government sponsored family-support programs).

64.

See BARBARA R. BERGMANN, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM POVERTY 91-116 (1996)

(detailing the shortfall of U.S. government programs designed to aid families and children).
65. Katharine Silbafugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1,23-26 (1996).
66.

Williams, supra note 61, at 1005.
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children's chances. In fact, domesticity in a society allergic to government
redistribution, such as the United States, is a sex/gender system that
systematically impoverishes children. One out of five U.S. children and one
out of two67 of African-American children are living in impoverished
conditions.
B. Domesticity and Government RedistributionPrograms
In addition to providing the groundwork for an analysis of welfare that
focuses on women, domesticity offers some significant insights into
government redistribution programs other than those that form part of the
social safety net. Mary O'Connell provides a particularly insightful
analysis. 6 8 O'Connell points out that in the United States, a three-tiered
system of economic security exists. 69 Her analysis is important so it should
be quoted at length:
The greatest security belongs to those whose attachment to paid
work is lengthy, uninterrupted, and highly remunerative .... A
second mode of access allows some persons to claim economic
security derivatively-that is, through the labor force participation
of another individual.... [T]his mode of access produced a
hodgepodge of entitlements, fraught with gaps, that frequently fails
to provide needed protection to the recipient. Finally, those who do
not engage in paid work, and who lack access based on a derivative
basis, must look to statutes providing means-tested benefits for
their economic security. These benefits are chronically
underfunded and their receipt is often stigmatized.7 °
This three-tier system is gendered, with the upper tier inhabited
predominantly
by men, and the two lower tiers staffed almost exclusively by
71
women.
To complete the O'Connell analysis, we not only need to build on
critical tax theory but also must go much further. The distribution of
government benefits plays a great, if not greater, role in defining women's
relationship to economic security. 72 As O'Connell points out, government
67. CuRTIs J.

BERGER & JOAN C. WILLIAMS, PROPERTY: LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 40

(4th ed. 1997).
68. See Mary E. O'Connell, On the Fringe: Rethinking the Link Between Wages and
Benefits, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1421 (May 1993); see also Mary Becker, Patriarchyand Inequality:
Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CIf. LEGAL F. 21 (1999); Silbaugh, supra note 65.
69.

O'Connell, supranote 68, at 1423-24.

70.

Id.

71.

Id. at 1449-70.

72. See Heidi Hartmann & Catherine Hill, Strengthening Social Security for Women, A
Reportfrom the Working Conference on Women and Social Security, 1999 INST. FOR WOMEN'S
POL'Y RES. 1, 7 (stating more women are dependent on social security, a government distribution,
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benefits include more than the obvious candidates: Social Security,
unemployment insurance, and worker's compensation. An analysis of how
government actions allocate wealth needs to include the tax subsidies given
to private health care and pension plans. 73 Today these benefits reflect the
model of an ideal worker who begins full-time work in early adulthood and
works uninterrupted until retirement. This model is designed around men's
bodies and life patterns; therefore, it discriminates against women.
According to estimates by the Older Women's League, by 2030, a majority
of women4 still will not work in the patterns required to receive Social
7
Security.
The solutions are complex, but two basic principles emerge. First,
social entitlements should be based equally on the two important kinds of
work most adults do: paid work and family work. Social security and other
benefits should not be earned only through paid work, but also through
family work. Second, benefits linked to paid work should not be limited to
ideal workers as traditionally defined. Health insurance policy waiting
periods, ERISA vesting rules, Social Security recency requirements and the
thirty-five-year work-life rule should be abolished or redesigned so that they
are not disproportionately skewed toward men. Currently men earn social
entitlements, such as Social Security, and private benefits such
as health
75
insurance and private pensions, that are less available to women.
IV. DESIGNING POLICIES TO CHANGE THE RELATIONSHIP OF WOMEN AND

ECONOMICS

This completes the basic analysis. The next question is this: how do we
change the relationship of women and economic security? To change that
relationship, we can change one or more of three basic relationships. First,
we can change the relationship between employers and employees. Second,
we can change entitlements within the family. Third, we can change the
configuration of the public and private spheres.
A. Changingthe Relationship between Employers and Employees.
One approach is to change the relationship of employers and
employees. We can accomplish these changes by requiring workplaces to
take account of the important family work responsibilities of their
employees. To do this, we need to go far beyond current "family friendly"
policies and rethink how we define the ideal worker. Most large employers
today have such policies, but, according to one survey, only three to five
because they "earn less and live longer than men").
73.

O'Connell, supra note 68, at 1505-06.

74.

Id. at 1497.

75.

See generally id. at 1454-71.
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percent of workers use them. 76 Why? The widespread perception, often true,
is that workers who do so often pay a steep price. "[W]hen you work parttime or temporary," said one secretary, "they treat you differently, they don't
take you serious." 77 Many policies explicitly affect promotion, as when law
firms take part-time attorneys off the partnership track, a practice that is still
very common. 78 Professional workers, who are disproportionately likely to
have access to work/family benefits, 79 also often find that "the only
responsible way to work part-time is to work full-time"; they find their hours
creeping up despite the fact they are being paid less, and many find
themselves with less desirable work assignments to boot. Some employers
enjoy a "family friendly" dividend when they pocket a percentage of a parttime worker's salary without hiring anyone else to handle the part-timer's
workload. Needless to say, this practice 81has fueled a backlash by child-free
workers against family friendly policies.
What would restructured work look like if it did not carry the penalties
it now does? A baseline is the principle of proportionality: proportional pay,
benefits, and advancement for part-time work. This is particularly important
in mandatory overtime economies that, in effect, wipe most mothers out of
the labor pool for good jobs. It is also vitally important in white-collar
contexts, because the "executive schedule" has sharply limited the number
of women who survive in business (more than ninety-five percent of upperlevel management is still men), 82 law (eighty-seven percent of law firm
partners are still men), 83 academics (more than seventy-four percent of
tenured professors are still men),8 4 and many other traditionally masculine
professions. The principle of proportionality is also important in good bluecollar jobs. Such jobs tend to have a high benefit load (up to forty percent of

76.

WILLIAMS, supra note 14, at 94.

77.

Id. at 72.

78. Interview with members of the Washington, D.C. legal community, for the Project on
Attorney Retention (the PAR Project) funded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Women's
Bar Association of the District of Columbia (Oct. 11, 2000) (developing a model reduced hours
schedule for Washington, D.C., law firms). The final report based on these interviews is available at
PAR PROJECT, BALANCED HOURS: EFFECTIVE PART-TIME POLICIEES FOR WASHINGTON LAW
FIRMS http://www.pardc.org (hereinafter PAR Report).

79.

UNBENDING GENDER, supranote 14, at 33.

80.

Id. at 72-75; PAR Report, supranote 78, at 18.

81. See, e.g., ELINORBURKETT, THE BABY BOON (2000).
82. UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 14, at 67 (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, The "NoProblem" Problem:Feminist Challenges andthe Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1765 n.168

(1991)).
83. Id. (quoting ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN INTHE PROFESSION, WOMEN IN THE LAW: A
LOOK AT THE NUMBERS 3 (1995)).
84. Joan C. Williams, How the Tenure Track Discriminates Against Women, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 27,2000, availableat http://chronicle.com/jobs/2000/10/2000102703c.htm.
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wages),85 which gives employers the motivation to require long hours of
existing employees rather than to hire new ones. In addition, traditionally
masculine blue-collar jobs rarely have part-time tracks, and, as we have
seen, mothers rarely work jobs with lots of overtime. Consequently,
scheduling plays a significant role in keeping women out of high-paying,
traditionally masculine blue-collar work (which is not to say that other
factors, notably sexual harassment, do not also play a role). 86 Finally, the
principle of proportionality can offer significant benefits to the working
poor, who often can find only part-time work, with depressed wage rates, no
benefits, and no chance for advancement. At Shopper's Food Warehouse, for
example, 8Part-timers are ineligible for promotion to management
positions.
To implement the principle of proportionality requires us to rethink the
ways we define an ambitious, committed, valuable worker. But family
responsive workplaces require other changes as well. For example, in
interviews with more than three hundred women in Iowa, sociologist
Jennifer Glass found that the women she spoke with, many of them working
class, expressed the need for flextime so that their work hours would match
with the hours of their childcare provider, as well as time off for medical
appointments, child illnesses (infants average six doctor's visits a year), 88
school plays and conferences. They also stated the need for an adequate
89
supply of quality, affordable childcare.
Voluntary programs that persuade employers to change traditional ways
of doing business hold significant promise, particularly in an age of high
employment. 90 The "business case" reflects the fact that current business
practices impose steep costs on employers. 9 1 Most dramatic are the costs of
high attrition among mothers in full-time or overtime work, and among
fathers in high-overtime environments. Human resources professionals
report that replacing a worker costs between seventy-five and one hundred
and fifty percent of the worker's annual salary, with more highly trained
workers costing more to replace. As a result, every time five associates leave
a Washington, D.C. law firm, more than a million dollars walk out the

85. O'Connell, supra note 68, at 1425. Note that this statistic is for all jobs, not just bluecollar jobs.
86.

UNBENDING GENDER,

supra note 14, at 78-81.

87. Julie McWilliams, Address at the Industrial Relations Research Association National
Public Policy Forum (June 22, 2000).
88.

JODY HEYMANN, THE WIDENING GAP 73 (2000).

89. Interview with Jennifer Glass, Chair of Department of Sociology, University of Iowa, in
Iowa City, Iowa (Oct. 13, 2000).
90. United States unemployment rate is only 4.2% (statistic taken from month of February
2001). See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
OUR
ECONOMY
AT
A
GLANCE,
http://stats.bls.gov/eag/eag.us.htm. (last visited Apr. 2, 2001).
91.

PAR Report, supranote 78, at 7-8.
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door.
Family responsive policies tend to reduce absenteeism. 93 When the
baby is sick, someone is going to take her to the doctor and will have to call
in sick to do so. But if employees have the option of taking
time off
94
formally, through flextime or part-time, absenteeism rates fall.
Productivity may rise as well. In 1930, the Kellogg Company
implemented six-hour workdays as a coping strategy for Depression-caused
unemployment. 95 After implementing the change, the company discovered
that worker productivity increased an average of three to four percent. 9 6 The
point is an intuitive one: having been one of those lawyers who worked
thirteen hours a day, I can tell you that my productivity in hour thirteen was
not the same as my productivity in hour three.
A final, and understudied, element of the business case for family
responsive policies is the correlation between employee satisfaction,
employee loyalty, and client loyalty. Employers who have effective family
responsive policies in an era when employee loyalty is hard to come by find
that employees who feel their family needs are being addressed can be
fiercely loyal, as in the case of the moving company that experienced zero
turnover when they offered telecommuting and other benefits, 97 or the
dermatology company that experienced zero turnover once it provided a
twenty percent discount to the neighboring family care unit, instituted
flexible work hours and provided parent education classes. 98 Employee
loyalty is important in itself because it reduces attrition and increases
motivation, but it is also important for another reason: study after study has
99
shown a correlation between retaining employees and retaining clients.
92.

UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 14, at 88.

93.

Seeidat9l.

94. Id. (quoting WORK & FAMILY

CONNECTION, INC., WORK & FAMILY: A RETROSPECTIVE

130 (1995)).

95.

JuLIEr B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERIcAN 154-55 (1992).

96. Id. ("[T]he efficiency and morale of our employees [are] so increased, the accident and
insurance rates are so improved, and the unit cost of production is lowered that we can afford to pay
as much for six hours as we formerly paid for eight.").
97. Interview with Jim Johnson, President, Johnson Moving and Storage, in Denver, Colo.
(May 11, 2000) [hereinafter Johnson Interview].
98.

See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 14, at 88.

99. See Keith Hammonds, Balancing Work and Family, Bus. WK., Sept. 16, 1996, at 74
(demonstrating that higher employee retention rates led to a seven percent increase in customer
retention); Patricia Sellers, Keeping the Buyer you Already Have, FORTUNE, Sept. 22, 1993, at 56
Oinking employee satisfaction to employee retention, which ultimately results in customer loyalty);
Patricia Sellers, 9hat Customers Really Want, FORTUNE, June 4, 1990, at 58 ("Customer retention
and employee retention feed one another."); Sue Shellenbarger, Companies Are Finding It Really
Pays To Be Nice to Employees, WALL ST. J., July 22, 1998, at BI ('We came up with conclusive
evidence that improving employee satisfaction will satisfy customers better and, in turn, improve
financial results...."); Watson Wyatt,
Strategy@Work (Oct. 20, 2000), at
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/ strategyatwork/editions2000/2000_0408.asp (noting that for one
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Again, for lawyers this is intuitive: we have all seen clients walk out the
door when "their" lawyer leaves.
Yet the fact is that twenty years of arguing the business case has gotten
us to where we are today: we have family responsive policies that look good
on paper but businesses seldom use them. One study found that current
policies are used by only three to five percent of workers. 10 0 We do not need
to graft marginal corrections onto an antiquated system, 10 1 rather we need to
rethink how we define the committed, ambitious worker.
Here is a radical proposition: employers should reward productivity.
We should choose and promote workers based on the quality of their work
product, not on the schedule they can keep. Why? In a society where
schedule correlates tightly with gender, a system that systematically rewards
people based on their ability to keep the schedule kept by most men, but few
women, discriminates against women.
To explore this, let's return to the definition of the ideal worker who
takes no time off for child-bearing or child-rearing. Who needs no time off
for childbirth? And, in a society where women still do the large bulk of the
childcare, who needs no time off for child-rearing? Designing workplaces
around men's bodies and men's traditional lifestyles is discriminatory.
Note that this is gender, not sex discrimination: what is at issue is not a
disadvantage that attaches to all women, but one that attaches to all
caregivers. That is, men who do not conform to traditional breadwinner
patterns are disadvantaged equally, indeed sometimes more, than are
women. 1 02 They also suffer from gender discrimination in the form of taunts
and comments that communicate that a "real man" does not take parental
leave. 10 3 Martin Malin has suggested that the Family & Medical Leave Act's
prohibition on employer interference with leave rights is a possible tool10for
4
combating this workplace hostility toward paternal use of parental leave.
The importance of adding this analysis to the business case is two-fold.

company, meeting employee satisfaction goals is as important as meeting financial goals).
100. UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 14, at 94 (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Fleeing Home
for the Comforts of an Office, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 6, 1997, at A23).
101. LoTTE BAILYN, BREAKING THE MOLD: WOMEN, MEN, AND TIME IN THE NEW
CORPORATE WORLD 67 (1993) ("All of these [work-family policy] responses are certainly helpful,
but they are still based on the assumptions that employees' family concerns can be treated on the
margins, conceptually distinct from the primary goals of the organization.").
102. See Martin H. Malin, Fathersand ParentalLeave, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (1994)
(citing instances where men are unable to take parental leave).
103. See id. at 1077-78 ("Employer sensitivity to the need to accommodate workers' family
responsibilities is increasing steadily. Unfortunately, many employers' willingness to make such
accommodations is limited to women workers. Men's accommodation requests are often met by,
'Your wife should handle it.' . .. Employers are not the only source of workplace hostility. Coworker hostility can generate powerful peer pressure. Such peer pressure can intimidate and deter
fathers from taking leave.").
104. See id. (illustrating the need for workplace accommodations to suit the family
responsibilities of men).
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First, many employers are people of good will, who are shocked at the
thought that they are systematically disadvantaging women. Take Jim
Johnson, president of the moving company Johnson Storage & Moving Co.,
mentioned above. After Johnson heard me speak, he went right back and
asked his human resources people whether his practice of not giving benefits
to part-timers affected mostly women. He was horrified to hear that it did,
and immediately offered proportional benefits to part-timers to the extent his
insurance company allowed him to do so. 105 We should not forget that, in
the United States, discrimination language is a language of social ethics.
Second, of course, discrimination language shifts our sense of who is
entitled to what. A sense that a failure to accommodate family
responsibilities could change contract negotiations, if unions could point out
the way that the systematic devaluation of part-time work systematically
discriminated against women. Who is entitled to what?
In addition, in certain cases discrimination analysis can be translated
into legislation, or into litigation under existing federal or state antidiscrimination statutes. 10 6 This is still in the early stages, but plaintiffs'
employment lawyers have begun to take cases that challenge either outright
discrimination against mothers (through a disparate treatment, intentional
infliction or hostile environment theory)' 0 7 or discrimination against those
working part- or flex-time (through a disparate impact theory) 10 8 or
violations of the Family & Medical Leave Act. 10 9 Cumulatively, these cases
can begin to change perceptions about work/family conflict, from the view
that it reflects only "mother's choice," to the view that it often signals
gender discrimination against men as well as against women.
B. ChangingEntitlements within the Family
The standard approach to changing entitlements within the family in
this country has been to try to change the allocation of family work between
men and women. This strategy has achieved some success. Men now
contribute more family work: but women still do between sixty-six and
eighty percent. 110
But what is also clear is that, just as there are two groups of womensome of whom do virtually all of the childcare, and others who share more
105.

Johnson Interview, supra note 100.

106. For further information, see Gender, Work & Family Project's webpage at
http://www.genderwork.org.
107. See, e.g., Wynn & Wynn, P.C. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 729 N.E.2d
1068 (Mass. 2000).
108.

See, e.g., Capruso v. The Hartford, Inc., No. 01-4250 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 6,2001).

109.

See Knussman v. Maryland, 16 F. Supp.2d 601 (D. Md. 1998).

110. See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 14, at 2; see also HAYS, supra note 24, at 100
(stating that mothers' caregiving amounts to seventy-four percent of "direct childcare").
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equally with their partners-there also has emerged a split among men.
Some men, notably in families that use the "tag team" approach, where both
parents work but one parent cares for the children while the other is at work,
do significant amounts of childcare. 11 1 But other men still do very little.
This picture is further complicated by class differences, with less privileged
men doing significantly more childcare than more privileged white men,
presumably because the tag-team approach appears to be most common
112
among working-class families.
This picture suggests that statistics averaging the amount of childcare
performed by men are less than informative. What we need are statistics that
break out tag-teamers from other men. I am told that recent time diary
studies make this possible. We shall see what information they yield." 3 All
this detail aside, the message that comes through loud and clear is that the
strategy of shifting the allocation of family work within the household has
been met with limited success. Forty years after women started bargaining
for equality within the household, it is estimated that they continue to
perform between sixty-six and eighty percent of the housework.1 14 We need
to be more thoughtful about why women continue to perform the majority of
household work, and this is where three areas of literature should prove
helpful. One is the booming literature on masculinity, which can help us
understand the gender pressures on men that make them resist the hydraulic
pressures within individual households to share work more equally."15 The
111. Jacqueline L. Salmon, 'Hi, Dad! Bye, Mom' - Couples Try Parentingin Shifts,
VASH.
POST, Aug. 2, 1998, at Al ("About 20 percent of the nation's two-parent, two-income households
with children are tag-team families, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. And experts say the
arrangement will become even more widespread in coming years as the growing demand for 24-hour
services generates more jobs with nonstandard hours."); see also KATHLEEN GERSON, No MAN'S
LAND 22-37 (1993) (finding that masculinity has become more variegated-that some men do a lot
whereas others do very little).
112.

LILLIAN B. RUBIN, FAMILIES ON THE FAULT LINE 93-94 (1994).

113. Interview with Beth Mattingly, Graduate Student, Sociology Dept., University of
Maryland (Oct. 5, 2000).
114. This estimate is comprised of different sources with varying sites. See, e.g., SCOTT
COLTRANE, FAMILY MAN: FATHERHOOD, HOUSEWORK, AND GENDER EQUITY 53 (1996) (noting
that even after men's increased participation is taken into account, women still contribute, on
average, three times the amount of housework than do men); HAYS, supra note 24, at 100 (stating
that in married couples, mothers contribute seventy-four percent of the total hours spent in direct
childcare); JAMES A. LEVINE & TODD L. PITTINSKY, WORKING FATHERS: NEW STRATEGIES FOR
BALANCING WORK AND FAMILY 26 (1997) ("The household gap is closing not just because fathers
are doing more at home, but because mothers are doing more in the workplace and less at home....
That is exactly what Rosalind Barnett found in her study of dual-earner couples. 'Altogether women
spend more time on household chores (about 3.7 hours a day) compared to the men (about three
hours a day) .. "); Joseph H. Pleck, Are "Family Supportive" Employer Policies Relevant to
Men?, in MEN, WORK, AND FAMILY 219-20 (Jane C. Hood ed., 1993) (stating that recent statistics
reveal that men participate in approximately one-third of the housework). What emerges from these
discrepancies is an immanently clear picture: although the statistics from the 1990's vary, male and
female household roles are nowhere near equal.

115. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, MANHOOD INAMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY (1996)
(describing the historical and psychological roles of American men).
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second is the growing literature on "gate-keeping" by women, including
Naomi Cahn's important insight that mothers often refuse to let go of the
sole-source supplier (primary caregiver) role because their identity as
women is tied up with that particular gender performance. 116 Finally, there
is another literature that does not, but should, exist: a literature that explores
the relationship of gender and class. One reason gender has proved so
unbending is because gender performances play a central role in class
formation. 117 Gender performances help create class status, as when the
ideology and practice of intensive mothering creates high-human-capital
kids. 118 The available cultural idioms for the performances of class are very
gendered, as when families consider having
the mother at home a signal of
119
status.
middle-class
at
"arrived"
having
The most basic fact about the typically privatized, psychologized,
American strategy of solving the work/family conflict by changing the
allocation of family work, is that it has failed. It is time to shift attention
away from women's psychology onto structural economic relations: the
structure of market work and the issue of who owns what within the family.
Both above and in other contexts, 120 I have discussed these issues as they
relate to families in the United States. Here I only want to add that, although
divorce law is the key locus for changing traditional notions of who owns
what within the family in the United States, in other countries inheritance
laws may be the key to gaining access to wealth for women. In many parts
of Africa, inheritance laws are often guided by customary law, which often
considers the woman to be the property of her husband and therefore
ineligible to inherit anything. 12 1 In Latin America, as another example,
122
inheritance laws focus on the children; the wife is effectively disinherited.

116.

See Calm, supra note 40, at 534-35.

117.

UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 14, at 34-37.

118.

See HAYS, supranote 24, at 115-18.

119.

UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 14, at 153-61.

120. See Williams, supra note 46; see also Joan Williams, Wives Own Hal? Winningfor
Wives After Wendt, 32 CoNN. L. REV. 249 (Fall 1999).
121. See Celestine L Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to
Cultural Legitimation of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 381
(Spring 2000) (explaining that in parts of anglophone Africa, customary law is officially recognized
and will, in many cases, prevail over the national constitution); see also Leslie Kurshan, Rethinking
Property Rights as Human Rights: Acquiring Property Rights for Women Using International
Human Rights Treaties, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOc. POL'Y & L. 353, 359-60 n.34-42 (2000)
(describing various examples of African countries where women cannot inherit their husband's

property).
122. See Steven Hendrix, Property Law Innovation in Latin America with
Recommendations, 18 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1995) (noting that even though women
ostensibly have equal property rights in civil law jurisdictions, local magistrates "often give all the
real property to the sons, irrespective of the law").
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C. Changingthe Relationship between the Public andPrivateSpheres
In this context, once again, we need to recognize the extent to which
conversations within American feminism have been framed within an
intensely privatized frame. The United States stands virtually alone among
developed nations in its conviction that child-rearing is a private frolic rather
than a social enterprise of vital importance. 12 3 The National Partnership on
Women and Families has taken the lead in its inexhaustible lobbying to
persuade the American Congress to provide for American parents the kinds
of parental leaves that are almost universal in developed nations outside the
United States. 124 The limited nature of what has been achieved, an unpaid
Family & Medical Leave Act that, at best, accounts for only three months of
child-rearing, a task that lasts twenty years, is attributable more to the
inhospitableness of the soil than lobbyists' skill. 125
If the Scandinavian approach of mandating leaves is one approach to
changing the configuration of the public and private spheres, the other is the
approach articulated by Martha Fineman, Nancy Dowd and others: to
establish a new social entitlements program that provides social subsidies to
all caregivers. 126 As I have argued elsewhere, social subsidies for caregivers
are extremely important as a measure to alleviate our high levels of
childhood poverty; they would also contribute to economic security for
12 7
many women.
D. FeministJurisprudenceand Care Work.
There seems to be a controversy brewing within feminist jurisprudence
over which of these three approaches is best. 12 8 This should not surprise us,
given the argument culture of academic life, in which the natural way to
engage is to criticize. But isn't the easy answer that we need to work on all
three? We need to try to change the relationship between employers and
employees; we need to change accepted notions of who is entitled to what

123.

Williams, supra note 61, at 988-90.

124. See THE NATIONAL
PARTNERSHIP
ON
http://www.nationalpartnership.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2000).
125.

WOMEN

AND

FAMILIES,

at

Family & Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (1994).

126. Fineman, supra note 20, at 26-27; see also NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING
FATHERHOOD 220-25 (2000) (discussing the disregard of the family in economic and public
policies); EVA FEDER KITrAY, LOVE's LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY

140-46 (1999) (discussing the need to change public policy and liberal theory to take dependency
into account).
127. Joan Williams, Exploring the Economic Meanings of Gender, 49 AM. U. L. REv. 987,
988- 90 (2000).
128.

See, e.g.. Symposium on the Structures of Care Work, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1389

(2001); Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000); Responses to Life's Work,

102 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2002).
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within the household; we need to fight the bizarrely privatized vision that
two prominent sociologists have dubbed the "children as pets" approach, in
which children are viewed as just another consumer item in which the public
1 29
need have no more interest in than in the acquisition of another Porsche.
All three projects contribute to the deconstruction of domesticity both
as an ideology, and as a system of structuring market work and delivering
child services. As feminists we need to be very thoughtful about what
Deborah Tannen has called the "argument culture," the tendency to engage
through attack. 130 Inevitably, we will disagree sometimes, and we need
intellectual room to explore those disagreements. However, we also need to
remember most feminists who are doing their job right will be struggling for
resources and credibility. We can safely assume that our articles, grant
proposals and tenure applications will not receive rave reviews from
conservatives in law and economics, advocates, doctrinalists, or many others
who, though they are people of good faith, are much the same as the
American public because feminists make them nervous. In this context, we
can count on one vote, or more, against our articles, grant proposals and
tenure applications for the simple reason that we are feminists. Is it not
better in this context to stick together?
V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we need to move away from an emphasis on the
disproportionate share of women among the poor, the wage gap, and the
"new theory of alimony" debate, towards a more sweeping analysis of
women and economics. When we do, we will find ourselves rewriting
Charlotte Perkins Gilman's approach by rejecting certain key elements of
domesticity she adopted without comment. These include the breadwinner
structure of market work, in which the ideal worker is someone who has few
significant responsibilities for children; the assumption that homemakers are
dependent and somehow lacking; and the notion that the costs of childrearing (in a system that provides for children's care by economically
marginalizing their caregivers) are "naturally" privatized onto individual
mothers without significant social support.
This is not to belittle Gilman's accomplishment: we stand on the
shoulders of giants. Like Gilman, we can only proceed by mobilizing certain
elements of domesticity against others. Thus Martha Fineman urges
socialization of the costs of child-rearing in the name of Mother. 131 I urge a
restructuring of work around the norm of parental care. We will attempt to
flip domesticity against itself in the manner of a judo master, using its own

129.

FOLBRE, supra note 20, at 109.

130.

DEBORAH TANNEN, THE ARGUMENT CULTuRE 7-8 (1998).

131.

MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SExuAL FAMILY, &

OTHER 20TH CENTURY TRAGEDMES 228 (1995).

HeinOnline -- 5 J. Gender Race & Just. 431 2001-2002

432

The Journalof Gender,Race & Justice

[5:2002]

momentum to throw it off balance. We embrace what we view as its
relatively innocuous elements to target what irks us most. This is inevitable
in a culture where domesticity is so pervasive. To make our arguments seem
plausible and persuasive, they need to resonate, and much of that resonance
turns out to stem from the sex/gender system all of us, including Gilman, are
striving to replace.
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